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1INTRODUCTION
Kunio Yoshihara categorizes Indonesia and 
Philippines, along with Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia as some Southeast Asian countries in 
which case belong to the Ersatz capitalism. He 
argues that these fast growing Southeast Asian 
countries did not practice the dynamic capitalism 
in the way the United States and Japan do. This 
so-called Ersatz capitalism  is identified by the 
compromise and inferior role of the states, the 
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Kapitalisme kroni merupakan salah satu fitur utama sistem kapitalisme semu. Sebagai negara Asia Tenggara yang 
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Crony capitalism is one main feature of the ersatz capitalism. Indonesian and Philippines, two East-Asian countries 
which are categorized by scholars in the same group practicing the form of ersatz capitalism system, respectively 
had undergone a historical period of robust authoritarian regime. This fact has indeed influenced the emergence of 
the strong cronyism in both countries. Through this article, we are briefly revisiting the experiences of Indonesia 
and Philippines during the Asian financial crisis 1997-98, focusing on their respective political reforms and the 
impact on the cronyism and eventually on the ability of both countries to survive the crisis. It is apparent that to a 
certain degree, the political reforms were indeed the key factor for both Indonesia and Philippines to outlast the hit 
of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. In other word, it was undeniably through a motion toward a more genuine 
capitalism system that these countries with that of ersatz capitalism could carry on against economic crises. 
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problems related to treatments towards the Chinese 
ethnics within each country, and the failure to 
develop better technological capabilities (1988).1 
1 Aside from its literal implication of being ersatz 
‘not-genuine’, with such features it would be quite 
easy to understand commonsensically why the er-
satz capitalism is regarded as an inferior model of 
capitalism compared to, say, the dynamic capital-
ism—which is supposedly practiced by the Anglo-
Saxon capitalist countries (see also the contrast 
with the Western Continental Europe with their 
welfare state system). In broad brush strokes, the 
2  | Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 7 No. 1, 2016
Various discussions on the distinction between the 
Ersatz capitalism, or pseudo-capitalism, and the 
echt capitalism are mostly conducted in terms of 
the inefficiency of the former model compared to 
the latter due to some extant characteristics of the 
South East Asian countries. The main features are 
the excessive government economic intervention 
in which case being detrimental to the free market 
system, and the thriving practice of rent-seeking 
come out of some socio-political behavior in 
those countries. Indonesia and Philippines, based 
upon their several socio-political resemblances, 
are inevitably appealing in revealing the ersatz 
characteristic of capitalism especially the 
unbridled cronyism in both countries. 
Prior to the currency and financial crises of 
1997-98, Indonesia is praised by the World Bank 
as one of the newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) by which it has a new model for emulating 
other developing countries. As one of the Highly 
Performing Asian Economies, Indonesia also 
achieved the sustained and equitable export-
led high growth and rapid industrialization 
(Sundaram, 2001, 19). Classified as one of the 
HPAEs, Indonesia has indeed been showing 
structural changes toward industrialization. 
Indonesia has also underwent a long term shift 
from the agricultural and oil based economy to 
the manufactures. The economic orientation is 
more global oriented as well as outward looking 
with which it can be exemplified by the expansion 
of manufacturing exports, and the participation 
in various schemes of international economic 
cooperation.2
dynamic capitalism is deemed more favourable to 
the advocates of a free market approach in manag-
ing the economy. This is supposed to be the ideal-
ized portrait of capitalism with its openness to in-
novations and pluralism of views. 
2   Dr. Thomas Lindblad examines that Indonesian 
economic development involves internal restruc-
turing and external relations, asserting that the 
admission of Indonesia to the HPAEs dictates an 
increasing economic orientation towards the East 
and South-East Asian region. The manifestation is 
that first, the Indonesian economic restructuring 
In contrast, the economic performance of 
Philippines used to be regarded as a failure. In 
1955, Philippines actually have had a GNP per 
capita twice as rich as Korea, and the country 
was more industrialized than Korea up to the 
late 1960s. However, throughout the post-
independence era, Philippines did not implement 
the systematic policy reforms (Kang, 2002, 49). 
The post-war Philippines possessed tremendous 
developmental assets. Yet, the country failed 
to have a sustainable economic development 
(Hutchcroft, 1998). The ongoing dominance 
of old oligarchic groups was deemed to be the 
reason despite various efforts of political and 
institutional reforms. Though Philippines made 
great achievements on the commitments to 
liberalization, privatization, and the reduction of 
monopolies; the political sphere of the country 
is the real obstacle for a sustainable economic 
development.
Aside from the fact that Philippines is not 
part of the High Performance Asian Economies, 
there are still numerous parallels between the 
economies of these two archipelagic countries. 
Both Indonesia and the Philippines are among 
five countries in which case they suffered from the 
economic crisis in 1997-98—the other countries 
are Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Meanwhile, 
corporate governance and politics are the traits 
be shared by both economies. However, the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997-98 has changed the 
practice of corporate governance, and the relation 
between business sectors and the government. 
The common shock of the crisis swept many 
is based on the East Asian model which involved 
agricultural revolution and technological upgrad-
ing for manufacturing; second, Indonesia has also 
integrated into the regional economic relations. 
The long term development of Indonesian econom-
ics toward such outward oriented alteration can be 
found in more detailed in the article by Dr. Thomas 
Lindblad, “Indonesian Economic Development in 
a Time of Globalization,” Bijdragen tot de Taal- en 
Volkenkunde, Vol. 154, No. 2, GLOBALIZATION, 
LOCALIZATION AND INDONESIA (1998), pp. 
193-217. 
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countries in East and Southeast Asia. But, the 
shifts in corporate governance and the business-
government relationship quite varied, so did with 
the outputs (Gourevitch, 2008, 70).
My question for this paper is thus quite 
simple. How was the exercise of government 
power in Indonesia and Philippines prior to the 
crisis, and how was the general immediate post-
crisis economic condition in these two Southeast 
Asian countries being notorious of the chronic 
cronyism? 
CRONY CAPITALISM: SOEHARTO 
AND MARCOS REGIME 
Crony capitalism is a popular catchphrase 
dubbed to be one of the major cause of the 
economic crisis in Asia during 1997-98. Crony 
capitalism or alliance capitalism appears like 
an economic rationale in which the need for 
government support gives the government a 
powerful to influence the behavior of both firms 
and bank. This logic often derogates from politics 
as corruption and the survival strategies of ruling 
regime (Wade, 1998, 1540). 
 Southeast Asian states shaped differently 
their respective management and political stability. 
Moreover, each country has a different capacity 
for constructive intervention. In general, the 
capacity depends on the structure of political 
supports, and the available means of political 
control owned by the state’s elites. In particular, 
the intervention of authoritarian regimes tends to 
be coercive, and controlled by powerful interests. 
In countries with more moderately broad-based 
regimes, the intervention of the state provides a 
greater degree of flexibility and political capacity 
with which state elites can manage economic 
and political challenges (Crone, 1988, 254). 
Indonesia and Philippines experienced the periods 
of authoritarian regimes of Soeharto (1967-98) 
and Marcos (1965-86) respectively. It would be 
interesting to see how the exercise of power of 
each regime affected the political stability of the 
respective country, and accordingly see the relation 
with the economic situation pre- and post-crisis 
1997-98.
Indonesia
Paul D. Hutchcroft in his book uses the 
term “rent capitalism” to describe systems 
in which money is invested in arrangements 
for appropriating wealth which has already 
been produced rather than in arrangement for 
actually producing it (Hutchcroft, 1998, 19). 
The Indonesian economy is thus a rent-seeking 
economy, and be distinguished from those 
countries with production-oriented capitalism. 
Capitalists in a country with rent capitalism are 
called the rent-seekers. They usually strive to make 
affiliation with the government or the bureaucrats 
in order to enjoy the rent—the economic process 
in which case  the gains come from manipulating 
the social and political environment. Moreover, 
Hutchcroft distinguishes two kinds of patrimonial 
state viz., the “patrimonial administrative state” 
and the “patrimonial oligarchic state.” Here, 
Indonesia falls into the first category because the 
dominant social force is either the bureaucratic 
elite or the political aristocracy and the masses 
and industrialists merely play the role as clients 
of the patrimonial office while the most important 
competition mostly occurs among the elites. In 
Indonesian case the elites—the patrons—refer to 
the military during the Soeharto administration 
(Hutchcroft, 1998, 46-7).
In Indonesia, politics and business are 
always bound up as large scale of resources in 
which case such is controlled by the government. 
Nowadays, Soeharto regime is always perceived 
by public as corruption, collusion and nepotism, 
an outcry of public resentment towards the crony 
capitalism. The alleged practice of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism is basically due to the 
abusive use of public posts for private gains. 
 Throughout the thirty two years of his 
presidency, Soeharto has established a centralized 
authoritarian regime and a strong corporatism. 
Structurally speaking, Soeharto was not an 
absolute leader or dictator like Ferdinand Marcos 
in the Philippines. Even though he possessed the 
strongest position, Soeharto shared his political 
power with a number of military elites within 
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the country. In economic sector, his governance 
has created numerous rent-seekers due to the low 
quality of intervention done by the government 
(Kunio, 1990, 123). 
The importance of posting military figures 
in bureaucracy has been conducted by Soeharto 
in order to secure his position. Letting them to 
gain political and economic benefits has indeed 
secured their loyalty to his administration by which 
it accordingly led to a grand scale corruption in 
Indonesia. Besides, Indonesian politics under 
Soeharto was also lacking of many factors such 
as accountability, transparency, democratic 
institutions and a free press—some of classic 
symptoms of an authoritarian regime (Robertson-
Snape, 1999, 590-1).
Soeharto regime, however, experienced a 
period of a sustained economic growth which also 
stabilized his reign. He put economic achievement 
as a priority. In the early period of his presidency, 
inheriting the disastrous economic condition from 
the Soekarno era, Soeharto exercised a rather 
liberal economy by opening up Indonesia for 
foreign investments and financial aids. However, 
during the decades of 1970s and early 1980s, the 
trend shifted with the introduction of nationalist 
and interventionist ideas. As a result, more 
restrictive, inward oriented and primarily state-led 
economics began. The government also started to 
impose protectionism which eventually opened 
many opportunities for political patronage and 
corruption (Robertson-Snape, 1999, 593-4). 
The socio-political environment of Indonesia 
under the Soeharto administration has created good 
opportunities for rent-seekers. Another feature 
of capitalism in Indonesia is that it has been 
dominated by the Indonesian Chinese descendant 
capitalists. This Chinese domination was never 
considered as a threat by the Soeharto and his 
military circle since the Chinese community in 
Indonesia never holds the political structure due 
to the Islamic stance has always been very strong 
(Kunio, 1990, 129). Since bureacracy, state banks, 
and business sector were under Soeharto’s control, 
a large sector of economy was practically very 
dependent on his central figure. The ethnic Chinese 
minority who then possessed seventy percent of 
the modern private sector were also very reliant on 
his protection. This highly concentrated Chinese 
capitalism resulted in the high rent-seeking 
practice from the pribumi capitalist counterparts. 
Many Chinese businessmen who had close 
connections with Soeharto and his agents of crony 
capitalism; were able to create their business 
empire. Major conglomerates in Indonesia were 
indeed of these Chinese who owned numerous 
companies and dominated Indonesian economy. 
Also some Soeharto’s offspring are included as 
major conglomerates. Many leading business 
figures took benefits from Soeharto’s patronage 
and protectionism such as Liem Sioe Liong 
of the Salim Group, Bob Hasan of the Hasan 
Group, and Goh Swie Kie of the Gunung Sewu 
Group. They were likely to enjoy privileges 
access to bank credits, forestry concessions, 
trade and manufacturing monopolies as well as 
state contracts for supply and construction. In the 
meanwhile, the Indonesian entrepreneurs were 
put-aside in the political process (Kang, 2002, 
189-190). This condition then triggered social riots 
against the ethnic Chinese during the dethronement 
of Soeharto in 1998 (Robertson-Snape, 1999, 596).
The economic and financial crisis of 1997-
98 later ignited transformations in Indonesia. The 
economic crisis has unleashed a major political 
change. It eventually led to the demise of an 
autocratic regime that have had a firm grip on the 
state and society for about three decades. Among 
the political turmoil, the weaknesses of Indonesian 
economic system exposed widely.
Philippines
Post-independence Philippine history 
consists of three main periods. During the 
democratic era of 1946-72, the Nacionalista 
and Liberal parties appeared identical in both 
ideologies and policies. The period from 1972-86 
was that of Marcos and the martial law. In the 
previous democratic era, the government was 
very weak and overrun by the interest group. The 
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elections are arecolored by violence and the vote 
buying, but in general were considered legitimate. 
The following period, however, was a worse phase 
of Ferdinand Marcos’ administration especially 
when he arbitrarily imposed the so-called martial 
law. The third period lasts from the period after 
Marcos’ regime were lost the U.S. support due to 
the “People Power” movement in 1986 up to the 
present. In this post-Marcos era, the Philippines 
started to practice a genuine democracy, and 
establishing a more stable legal and political 
institutions (Kang, 2002, 50). However, during 
these periods the basic pattern between the 
Philippine state and the dominant economic 
interest actually remained similar. 
The practice of crony capitalism in 
Philippines was rooted in the fact that the 
Philippine politics subsumed under one basic unit. 
The lack of differentiation in interests among the 
existing political parties was also due to this factor, 
to wit, the basic unit existed in the extended family 
and its connection with other oligarchic families. 
Throughout the democratic era the Liberals and the 
Nacionalistas held power in the same number of 
times, and each party succeeded in posting three 
presidents. Indeed, Ferdinand Marcos was the only 
president to win re-election. It was very usual for a 
member of a political party to shift his affiliation. 
Typically, a Filipino politician has a personal 
system of alliances with other politicians. Marcos 
himself first ran for legislature as a member of 
Liberal party, but then he gained the presidential 
position through the Nacionalista Party (Kang, 
2002, 123-4). 
The rent capitalism is the main feature 
of Philippines as well. According to Paul D. 
Hutchcroft, the Philippine type of polity is the 
“patrimonial oligarchic state”. In such state, 
a powerful oligarchic business class extracts 
privilege from a largely incoherent bureaucracy. 
In contrast to the other type of “patrimonial 
administrative state” where the economic force 
is entirely dependent on the state apparatus, the 
ones who benefit the most of the rent capitalism 
in Philippines are not the bureaucrats, but the 
oligarchs (Hutchcroft, 1998, 52). The oligarchs 
have access to the state during the democratic era 
through electoral competition. Despite the political 
competition, the legislature also played important 
roles in the rent-seeking practices. Usually, 
aspiring opposing politicians who need supports 
would appeal the oligarchs, promising some spoils 
when they win the electoral competition. 
The pattern of crony relations with its 
overwhelming rent-seeking demands in Philippines 
has contributed to a high transaction cost, and 
implying lower economic performance. Due to the 
competition among business groups over the spoils 
of state, the power shifted rapidly among groups 
and entailing the instability of property rights and 
elites (Kang, 2002, 145). 
T h e  b u r e a u c r a c y  w i t h i n  M a r c o s 
administration actually experienced significant 
autonomy and the small-scale reforms. However, 
such reforms did not enhance the development 
process since Marcos only wanted to gain the aid 
of international and U.S. agencies in providing 
financial supports, all of which are eventually 
enjoyed by his cronies and his individual interests 
(Kang, 2002, 74-5). This be in line with Hutchroft’s 
analysis that the patrimonial oligarchic state like 
Philippines tend to be more resistant to reform 
(Hutchcroft, 1998, 53). In the era of Marcos 
martial law (1972-86), the concentration of power 
is located within his presidential palace. Marcos 
was able to strengthen the state and centralized 
control under his own command. He also created 
a new oligarchs to take place the old elites, and 
this new oligarchs was very much dependent on 
Marcos’ support. Marcos also sought to conquer 
and attack any potential competitors of his oligarch 
(Hutchcroft, 1998, 136-8). Thus, such oligarch 
changed into a more “patrimonial administrative 
state”. 
Ricardo Manapat in his book describes the 
magnitude of the accumulated wealth of Marcos 
and his cronies. During the period of Marcos regime 
every major economic activity in Philippines is 
controlled by his family, relatives, or cronies. 
These people owned most key corporations. They 
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acted either as Marcos nominees or on their own 
behalf and serving as his money-making network 
that have had access to the national coffer, the 
resources of private banks, international loans 
from multinational banks and aid money from 
the U.S. and Japan. These corporations also 
enjoyed many privileges, such as tax exemptions, 
monopolies, lucrative contracts, and sometimes 
military forces which would be made available for 
his contacts as a means in economic competition 
(Manapat, 1991).
The political sphere of Philippines was 
assessed to be the pivotal reason of the country’s 
economic laggard. In many aspects, the Philippines 
possessed all necessary ingredients to successfully 
develop. The country had great entrepreneurial 
talents, well-educated workforce, rich natural 
resources as well as lively economist and 
development specialists. Yet, Philippines could 
not achieve the level of newly industrializing 
economies (Hutchcroft, 1998, 4). As Kang states 
these qualified technocrats are used for the benefit 
of the corrupt regime of Ferdinand Marcos. 
Indeed, corruption is not the only variable 
for affecting growth. It is crucial nonetheless. In 
the cases of Indonesia and Philippines, the political 
sphere under the authoritarian governments 
have affected their economic performance. The 
authoritarian Soeharto administration in Indonesia 
also restricted the economic development. 
Moreover, the economic sectors during Soeharto 
regime has always been dominated by the state, 
mostly handled by his family members. However, 
although the condition was very much alike to 
Philippines under the Marcos regime, Indonesia 
still enjoyed a moderate growth due to the large 
oil reserves. 
The cases of Indonesia and Philippines 
show that the excessive concentration of power 
in the hand of political elites and their cronies 
led to a state-dominated economy. This is run by 
patronage and corrupt people have implied a weak 
economic system. All weaknesses exposed during 
the financial crisis hit Asia in 1997. The following 
section will give an overview on the economic 
crisis of 1997-98 in both countries.  
FINANCIAL CRISIS 1997-98: 
INDONESIA  AND PHILIPPINES
Sequentially, the Asian crisis started with the 
drastic depreciation Thai Baht on July 2, 1997. It 
occurred immediately after the currency floated 
as many investors hurriedly sold their holdings in 
local currency including Baht. The depreciation 
is followed by the far-reaching contagion to other 
currencies. In mid-August, Indonesia experienced 
the similar flotation and depreciation against the 
US currency as worried by investors and local 
companies in which case they started to sell local 
currencies as much as possible after the sudden 
capital flight out in Thailand. Next, Taiwan’s 
devaluation came in mid-October. By November, 
the panic swept the whole region including 
South Korea (Wade, 1998, 1541-42). The Asian 
financial crisis reached its climax in the midst 
of 1998. Indonesia as one of the most impacted 
country reached a negative economic growth rate 
at 13 percent. The poverty rate also increased 
significantly. Philippines initially managed to 
response to the crisis quite positively during the 
last half of 1997 as it posted a growth rate of 5.2 
percent (Hicken, 2008, 207).
More recently, analyses on the Asian crisis 
indeed show that each country has some specific 
characters either on the causes or on the effects. 
The general consensus is that the contagion swept 
over almost all economies in Asia. However, the 
depreciation of currency suffered by each country 
though it was varied in terms of its intensity. 
Thai obviously suffered the most, and followed 
by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Singapore and Taiwan experienced the mild 
depreciations. While China and Hong Kong did 
not suffer any depreciation due to their capital 
controls (Djiwandono, 2009, 68). Ten years after 
the crisis, the appreciation of Asian currencies 
also varied greatly. Korean Won and Singaporean 
Dollar recovered 90 and 95 percent of their 
respective rates, the Thai Baht and Malaysian 
Ringgit 70 percent from the pre-crisis level, 
Philippine Peso 50 percent, and Indonesian Rupiah 
only 25 percent. As for the economic growth and 
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investment rates, though recovering, their GDP 
and investment rates are lower than the pre-crisis 
levels (Djiwandono, 2009, 69).
In Indonesia the contagion manifested a 
distinct domestic type. Crisis in Indonesia is 
marked by a foreign exchange market crisis, 
and was followed by a banking crisis. The latter 
accordingly caused a general economic crisis 
leading to a socio-political crisis that also putting 
an end to the Soeharto administration in May 
1998. The crisis in Indonesia is indeed triggered 
by the combination of external causes—“the 
herd instinct mentality in the financial market” 
facing the contagion—and internal causes, 
institutional weaknesses, cronyism and faulty 
policies (Djiwandono, 2009, 69-70).  
 The socio-political development in 
Philippines was rather different from Indonesia. 
Philippines had started some reforms prior to 
the crisis, a development which turned out to be 
beneficial for the country during the economic 
malaise in 1997-98, even though the reforms 
did not bring any wonders for the Philippine 
economics as the economic performance of the 
country remained slow.  
 Philippine government undertook a 
number of significant reforms of the real sector 
of the economy in the 1980s until 1990s. There 
had been various attempts to change the financial 
system, but it was not until such decade that 
significant reform is achieved by Philippine. This 
is followed by a period of reform during 1993-
1995 in which the central bank was rehabilitated; 
commercial banks were forced to increase their 
capitalization ratios; new foreign and domestic 
entrants were allowed to enter the market; and the 
quality of prudential regulation was strengthened. 
The result was an increase in competition. The 
finance was increasing not only in quantity but also 
in terms of its quality (Noland, 2000, 405). From 
many financial indicators, on the eve of financial 
crisis of 1997-98, Philippines indeed showed more 
solid conditions.
POST-CRISIS 1997-98: REFORMS AND 
RECOVERY
Indonesia initially showed similar conditions 
and vulnerabilities as other countries in crisis. 
Generally Indonesia also exhibited a good 
response towards the crisis. However, the country 
was eventually the worst case, suffering from 
the crisis the most and taking the longest time 
to recover. In terms of the immediate impacts 
of crisis, Indonesia suffered from the negative 
GDP growth rate, the currency depreciation 
and the negative performance of capital market 
(Djiwandono, 2009, 71-2).
 Prior to the crisis, the average growth of 
Indonesia reached 8 percent. After the negative 
point in 1998, the rate picked up but in much 
slower pace of 4.8 percent. The financial sector was 
the hardest hit, and followed by the manufacture 
sector. But the agriculture sector remained strong. 
The current investment percentage of GDP is also 
lower than the pre-crisis situation. The slower 
paced of Indonesian economic growth post-crisis, 
however, is also due to several external challenges 
like the global slowdown and the higher oil price 
(Indrawati, 2008).
Nevertheless, poverty rate in Indonesia 
started to decline gradually since 1999 up to 2005. 
In 2006, moreover, due to the high increase in 
world fuel price the poverty rate increase again 
as Indonesia has been more and more dependent 
on oil imports. The rate was 15.97% in 2005 
and 17.75% in urban and rural areas prior to re-
decreasing on the following years (16.58 in 2007 
to 11.42 in 2011) (Tambunan, 2012, 45).
The crisis in 1997-98 has forced the 
government to undergo structural reforms. These 
post-crisis structural reforms encompassed some 
institutional, economic and social restructuring. At 
the end of Soeharto regime, within the institution 
level, changes began to take place. Indonesia 
started to practice the democratic direct election; 
TNI and Polri are separate bodies; an anti-
corruption commission was founded; and the legal 
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reform was imposed. Reforms of the economic 
sectors contained measures like the debt and 
bank restructuring, regional autonomy and fiscal 
decentralization, tax and budget reform and the 
inauguration of an independent central bank viz., 
Bank Indonesia (BI). The government also gave 
the direct subsidy as well as compensation, and 
created the pro-poor budget for education, health 
and social expenditure (Indrawati, 2008).
In the meantime, the neighboring country 
Philippines has made a surprise when the 
Asian financial crisis hit. Right after the crisis, 
Philippines could manage to bounce back quickly 
because of the relatively well-manage response 
of the government. Compared to other crisis-hit 
countries, Philippine economy was in a better 
shape. It indeed regained strength quickly. The 
corporate sectors were better off compared to 
those of Thailand and Indonesia. The reform 
program of President Fidel Ramos prior to the 
crisis somehow has ignited public optimism. 
Unfortunately, due to the crisis did not really 
caused as much anxiety as what happened in 
Thailand, it did not encourage further political 
and economic reforms in the Philippines (Hicken, 
2008, 208-9).
 Prior to the crisis, Philippines had been 
poorer compared to other Asian economies. 
Thankfully, the country became not as vulnerable 
to capital flows like the richer economies that 
were heavily indebted. During Corazon Aquino 
administration, Philippines started its economic 
liberalization some of which is continued by 
Fidel Ramos. These post-Marcos governments 
started to take measures such as decentralization, 
privatization and long term reforms. The short-
run result was, among others, the end of unjust 
powerful oligarchs. The exercise of democracy 
in the country positively affected the overall 
economic and political conditions (Kang, 2002, 
171-5).
With its notorious reputation of being a 
laggard, the Philippines managed better compared 
to its counterparts due to three factors. Firstly, its 
financial system was in a better condition after a 
series of reforms performed by the Fidel Ramos 
government. Other sectors such as banking and 
real estate used to improve prior to the crisis. 
Secondly, the legacy of Ferdinand Marcos era and 
the uncertainty during Aquino administration was 
the slow paced liberalization in the country. This 
turned out to be a good thing during the crisis 
since Philippines decided to be a participant in 
some speculative investments and private debt-
booms belatedly. Thirdly, the country possessed 
a consistent crisis management and political 
system so it could tackle the crisis well (Hicken, 
2008, 221).
Historically, Philippines used to have  a 
repressed and inefficient financial system. In the 
1970s, the country was a country with a repressed 
financial system consider its capital flows, 
privatization, bank autonomy, entry barriers, 
interest rates and credit controls. The Philippine 
banking sector is also characterized by “rampant 
favoritism” and the “inefficient state regulation 
(Noland, 2000, 404).”
Since 1999, Filipinos have high expectations 
in the fostering economic recovery during 
President Joseph Estrada administration. 
Nonetheless, his leadership faced resistances in 
which case many policies, programs, and political 
initiatives faltered, and reduced his political 
popularity. Amidst the political dispute between 
Estrada against his oppositions, Philippines 
crawled from the regional economic crisis. The 
expected economic performance, to wit growth 
rate of 3 to 3.4 percent, was relatively slower 
compared to other countries are hit harder by the 
crisis such as Thailand and Malaysia in which they 
expected 5.4 percent of growth rate (Bolongaita, 
2000, 67). 
Generally there were changes affecting the 
corporate governance right after the crisis. Rapid 
inflows of foreign money, major acquisitions by 
foreign firms, adoption of international code of 
transparency in governance, reforms of formal 
financial structure, more information came from 
both private and public sectors, all hinted at the 
ending of the crony capitalism (Gourevitch, 
2008, 74). Specialists assessed there are three 
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possible channels of change in East and Southeast 
Asian corporate governance: (1) the rule of law, 
which provide common law and is stronger than 
civil law; (2) political institutions with better 
accountability and conforming the constitutions; 
and (3) social forms of power that involve civil 
society (Gourevitch, 2008, 138-9). 
It is apparent that the crisis pushed countries 
like Indonesia and Philippines to inevitably 
take some necessary measures and indeed some 
total reforms. Having discussed Philippines has 
started ahead with reforms and restructuring of its 
bureaucracy, Indonesia has to struggle in putting 
an end to the old autocratic regime since the Asian 
financial crisis hit the country.  
In a broader context, Indonesia and 
Philippines also experienced significance changes. 
The post-crisis economic performance has slowed 
in such a way. However, the national resilience 
against the external shocks has improved. There 
have been considerable improvements, yet 
both countries still have a lot of things to do 
(Bhaskaran, 2009, 113). 
CONCLUSION
Both Indonesia and Philippines show the 
strong patrimonial features. On the one hand, 
Philippines demonstrated a more patrimonial 
oligarchic state. On the other hand, Indonesia 
showed a patrimonial administrative state. 
However, the capitalist system of both countries 
are exercised by an abusive autocratic regime 
which seems to be similar with the crony 
capitalism. The incoherent bureaucracy of 
Philippines is exploited by the money-making 
network of Marcos’ family. In contrast, the 
protection system of Soeharto bureaucracy 
created some ample opportunities for rent-
seekers. Yet, under the fully centralized regime 
and Marcos’ martial law, Philippines resembled 
like Indonesia where the bureaucracy consisting 
of a narrow elite base; was far stronger, and they 
could manipulate society as well as diminishing 
the public pressure. As a result, the powerful 
interests in both countries held extensive control 
constraining autonomy and capacity.
The corporate governance in Indonesia and 
Philippines have had to undergo some reforms 
following the financial crisis of 1997-98. Prior to 
the crisis, Philippines has already begun reforms, 
and restructuring its financial sectors. The used-
to-be underperformed country took benefits 
from these advance and positive changes, and 
responding the crisis quite well compared to other 
Asian countries. In contrast, the Indonesian case 
was rather unique. The crisis started as a financial 
crisis as in other Asian countries but then it grew 
into a multidimensional crisis, including a socio-
political crisis culminating with the dethronement 
of Soeharto, and putting his crony capitalism 
to an end. It is obviously clear that reforms 
and restructuring in political as well as socio-
economic sectors have played some pivotal roles 
in making the economic recovery in Indonesia 
and Philippines possible.  
Perhaps, the next question is located within 
the magnitude of reforms taking place in both 
countries. While the Asian financial crisis 1997-
98 has created a great momentum for Indonesia 
to undergo some socio-political reforms, the 
Philippines were not able to fight in a similar 
way. The later development of Indonesia and 
Philippines have shown another thing. Recent 
studies show that the national toils to overcome 
the cronyism in Indonesia and Philippines 
implied different outcomes in their respective 
macroeconomics. Some scholars believe that, 
unlike Indonesia, Philippines did not succeed 
in improving their economy further albeit they 
have conducted earlier reforms.3 Philippines 
3 For instance see the article by Ben Reid (2000), 
“Crisis in the Philippines Left: Implications for the 
Asia Pacific,” in Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
30:2, pp. 181-198. Reid points out that while the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997 has triggered pro-
gressive social changes in various countries such 
as Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea, the 
Philippines which actually had similar opportuni-
ties since a decade prior to the then crisis with the 
end of Marcos’ regime failed to follow the positive 
trend. He recognizes that one principal reason is the 
failure of the anti-Marcos movement—most nota-
bly the Communist Party of the Philippines—in 
establishing political opportunities to obtain more 
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suffered from a downturn after their initial prompt 
recovery. The impacts of Asian financial crisis in 
1997-98 in Philippines deemed mild and failed to 
create necessary conditions for a more powerful 
socio-political reform but eventually implying the 
post-crisis malaise in the country.
Examining the experiences of these two 
South-East Asian countries has allowed us 
to pinpoint how the particularity of Asian 
capitalism, as being contrasted to its Anglo-
Saxon counterpart, functions during the economic 
crisis. Indeed, South-East Asian capitalism has 
been compared to the East Asian cases where 
cronyism is also ever present. But the South-East 
Asian cronyism lacks some beneficial aspects 
of cronyism which can be found in East Asia, 
leading to the economic inefficiency.4 The South-
East Asian ersatz capitalism is seemingly brittle 
in dealing with the economic crises. Reforms to 
combat cronyism are indispensable due to the 
latter has implied some economic vulnerability. 
Albeit the differing outputs shown by the 
experiences of both countries, the credence that 
thorough political changes and social transforma-
tions after all this time. The democratization and 
administrative reforms by the elites of Arroyo, Ra-
mos, and Estrada were said to have brought very 
little improvement to the population. 
4  David Kang particularly discusses the East Asian 
cronyism and highlights how it is not as deleterious 
as the South-East Asian counterpart. He approach-
es the issue of Asian cronyism from the aspect of 
transaction costs and the effectiveness of actors in-
volved in the the whole cronyism practices. Taking 
the exemplary case of South Korea where extensive 
cronyism turned out to be beneficial, Kang show-
cases that close personal and family connections in 
the political and economic life of Korea have cre-
ated long term stability between government and 
business elites. This resulted in what he calls “mu-
tual hostages” where neither the government nor 
the business elites gained the upper hand. Such mu-
tual hostages reduce transaction costs and eventu-
ally lessen rent-seeking competition. And the exact 
opposite of such advantageous cronyism is that of 
the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines. See Da-
vid C. Kang (2003), “Transaction Costs and Crony 
Capitalism in East Asia,” in Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 35, No. 4 (Jul., 2003), pp. 439-458.
political democratization and reforms are de 
rigueur for economic improvement to various 
degree still essentially stands. In a nutshell, the 
more democratic the countries’ politics is, the 
better the economy shall be. 
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